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ABSTRACT 
Lily Sharzad Emamian: Iran and the European Energy Union: Prospects, Developments, and 
Challenges for a New Natural Gas Partner in the European Energy Market 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 This thesis explores European energy policy with respect to Iran in the context of the 
European Energy Union and the European Commission’s mission to diversify and secure the 
EU’s supply of natural gas.  The potential for Iran, a gas-rich nation and former EU fuel supplier, 
to accelerate the EU’s coordination of its institutions, Member States, and private 
stakeholders offers a litmus test for the Commission’s progress on the European Energy Union. 
The Commission’s ability to drive energy policy management and coordination remains a 
challenge, as the near-term interests of Member States and private stakeholders often diverge 
from the European Commission’s strategic energy objectives. Furthermore, the difficulties with 
coordination of a European energy strategy across Member States and need for increased 
investments in infrastructure are predicted to result in Iranian natural gas remaining a small part 
of the EU’s energy mix in the short to medium-term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission’s efforts to establish a Europe-wide energy strategy for long-
term climatic, geopolitical and economic stability may lead to an opening of new energy trade 
with new partners as it seeks to diversify its sources supply. Potential partners such as Iran, 
which has vast reserves of both petroleum and natural gas, present both an opportunity to achieve 
such diversity, yet also present challenges. Iran’s re-entry on the global energy stage is marked 
by the the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by six 
world powers and the European Union (EU). The July 20, 2015 agreement relieves economic 
sanctions on Iran that severely restricted trade, and has ignited extensive global trade discussions 
and deal-making as governments and corporations consider how best to engage with and invest 
in Iran going forward. Europe has a long history of trade relations with Iran, particularly of 
energy resources, and as the EU considers numerous approaches to energy security, its 
institutions, Member States and European corporations are actively weighing what Iran has to 
offer as home to the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves.  1
The European Commission’s focus on natural gas is rooted in historically recent energy 
developments: Over the past decade, the world’s proven natural gas reserves have increased from 
 “Iran,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, last modified June 19, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/1
international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN.
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119.1 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 1994 to 186.5 tcm in 2013.  Additionally, global natural gas 2
production has increased by an average of 2.4 percent between 1994 and 2013.  As Europe 3
continues to assertively develop renewable energy sources as part of its 2020 Climate Energy 
Package, it is also assessing how to continue to leverage this abundant, relatively clean source of 
energy as a transition fuel to enable its ambitious ‘20-20-20’ commitment to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.  4
Implementation of a comprehensive EU energy policy has made forward strides since the 
2007 Lisbon Treaty that enabled the European Council to define an ambitious “New Energy 
Policy for Europe.”  The Energy Policy explicitly sought sustainability, competition and security 5
of energy supply.  
In 2009, the first legal basis for EU Energy policy was added as Energy Article 194 in the 
EU Treaty, and in October 2014, previous “20-20-20” goals for emissions reduction, increased 
use of renewable energy sources (RES) and improved energy efficiency were endorsed in the 
European Council’s Energy and Climate Package of 2030.  This package also endorsed the 6
concept of a European Energy Union as an organization chartered to implement the Policy, and 
 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015,” BP, June 2015, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-2
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.; Note that while the data standard for natural gas is cubic meters 
(measured at 150C and 1013 mbar), this thesis will cite sources verbatim and indicate a calculated conversion 
immediately following in parentheses, based upon conversion of 1 cubic foot = 0.0283 cubic meters.
 Ibid.3
“20-20-20” refers to the EU objectives for year 2020: to achieve a 20 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions from 4
1990 levels, 20 percent of EU energy sourced from renewables and 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency 
from 1990 levels. “2020 climate & energy package,” European Commission, April 15, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/strategies/2020/index_en.htm. 
 European Commission, “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 5
European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union, December 13, 2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT.
 Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “From the European Energy Community to the Energy Union: A Policy 6
Proposal for the Short and the Long Term,” Notre Europe, January 2015, pages 29 and 44, http://
www.institutdelors.eu/media/energyunion-andouravinois-jdi-jan15.pdf?pdf=ok.
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enable energy coordination among EU institutions and Member States.  However, as 7
opportunities to diversify energy sources leveraging new markets such as Iranian natural gas 
become apparent, a significant obstacle will pose challenges to ongoing progress: the problem of 
energy governance in an environment where bilateralism continues to be resilient. 
Aalto and Temel describe the “great power” problem as the phenomenon in which private 
companies and ‘large’ or influential EU Member States act as the real shapers of the European 
natural gas market in practice despite EU institutions’ efforts to expand their reach. In the field of 
policymaking, “the resilience of bilateralism [in Member State behavior] seriously constrains 
EU-level external energy relations.”   8
i. Thesis statement 
 While post-sanctions Iran presents a potential opportunity for Europe to embrace a new 
source of natural gas supplies, one that that could help meet the diversification goals of the 
European Commission, there are various problems inhibiting both actors from fully engaging 
with one another in natural gas commerce. These problems include a lack of existing 
infrastructure and the presence of cheaper and more convenient alternatives of natural gas 
trading partners for both actors.  
Perhaps most critically, existing EU Member State interests, specifically the strength of 
private producers and distributors and bilateral relationships with foreign suppliers, reinforce the 
existing status quo in the gas market and are a limit on the capacity of the European Commission 
to develop EU-wide policy as well as open its markets to new suppliers. As a result of the 2009 
 Ibid, page 121.7
 Pami Aalto and Dicle Korkmaz Temel, “European Energy Security: Natural gas and the Integration Process,” 8
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 4 (2013), 758-774, doi: 10.1111/jcms.12108.
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Treaty of Lisbon, EU Member States and EU institutions have shared competences in energy 
policymaking which, in the current environment, have often led to national and private interests 
challenging federalist ones.   9
By citing examples of these conflicts, this thesis argues that if Member State cooperation 
with the Commission remains limited, Europe will miss a unique and timely opportunity to 
engage with Iran in natural gas trade. Instead, key Member States will continue to rely upon 
Russia as a primary supplier for the foreseeable future. It also argues that the EU’s Energy 
Union, an entity articulated in the Lisbon Treaty, is crucial to the Commission’s energy 
diversification goals.  The pages that follow provide a picture of how the EU is working to 10
implement the Energy Union, and address whether Member States will be able to operate within 
its framework to embrace Iran as a new natural gas partner. 
ii. Methodology 
This analysis will focus on exploring the European Commission’s key energy policy 
priorities and considerations as Iran re-enters the international market and whether European and 
Iranian natural gas interests are compatible following adoption of the JCPOA. Empirical research 
informs this analysis and provides perspective on the geopolitics affecting the European Union’s 
strategy toward the Iranian natural gas market. 
 European Commission, “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 9
European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union.
 Ibid.10
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iii. Research Sources 
Existing academic literature discussing European energy strategy toward Iran is fairly 
limited, and therefore, the analysis and conclusions drawn in this thesis are also informed by a 
series of interviews with experts on EU policy and Iranian commercial policy. They are Bernd 
Weber, expert of European energy and neighborhood policy; Thomas Pellerin-Carlin of Notre 
Europe’s energy department; Thierry Coville of the Institut pour la recherche et stratégie 
internationale (IRIS) and Novancia Business School in Paris; Rodrigo Pinto-Sholtbach at the 
International Energy Agency, and Sohbet Karbuz of Mediterranean Observatory for Energy in 
Paris. 
The scarcity of academic literature can be partially attributed to the fact that Iran has been 
isolated from the global economy to varying degrees since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Another 
element contributing to the limited literature on EU energy strategy is the fact that Member 
States possess a national competence to develop their own domestic energy policies.  Indeed, 11
the existing pan-European discourse on natural gas production and consumption is a rather recent 
phenomenon, coincident with increased EU efforts regarding climate change and energy 
independence. 
Empirical references include publications by non-governmental organizations and think 
tanks focused on broad issues such as the history of EU Energy Policy, the EU’s evolving energy 
strategy, and the future of natural gas as a major global resource.  Few resources discussed 12
 Ibid.11
 Langsdorf, Susanne. “EU Energy Policy: From the ECSC to the Energy Roadmap 2050,” Green European 12
Foundation, 2011; Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “De la communauté européenne de l’énergie à l’Union de 
l’énergie : Une proposition politique pour le court et le long terme,” Notre Europe, January 2015, http://
www.institutdelors.eu/media/unionenergie-andouravinois-ijd-jan15.pdf?pdf=ok.; Multiple Authors, “The Future of 
Natural Gas : An Interdisciplinary MIT Study,” 2011.
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issues directly related to the focus of this thesis. One example is a report from the European 
Council on Foreign Relations describing Europe’s plan for engaging with Iran following the 
nuclear deal.  Another such article, published by the Center for a New American Security 13
(CNAS), discusses the anticipated effects of Iran’s re-entry into the global economy.  14
Despite the limited availability of empirical analyses discussing European energy strategy 
towards Iran, there is relatively abundant, technical literature on global energy consumption, 
production, and future projections. While reviewing empirical literature on the topic of global 
energy supply, demand, and production, reports published by private companies such as British 
Petroleum (BP) proved to be particularly useful. Reports from government agencies and 
institutions, specifically the European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy (DG 
Energy), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the OECD’s International 
Energy Agency provided substantive information on energy projections for Europe and the 
United States, as well as each respective country’s diplomatic relations and developments with 
Iran.  
 The question analyzed in this thesis, “Will Iranian natural gas enter the European market 
in the short or medium-term?” is addressed from a European perspective and necessitated an 
initially broad understanding of the background and history of EU’s energy market in order to 
establish appropriate analytical context. However, for the sake of feasibility, this thesis then 
narrows the scope to focus on drawing conclusions from EU policy information that was readily 
 Geranmayeh, Ellie. “Engaging with Iran : A European Agenda”. European Council on Foreign Relations. July 13
2015.
 Rosenberg, Elizabeth and Dr. Sarah Vakhshouri. “Iran’s Economic Reintegration : Sanctions Relief, Energy, and 14
Economic Growth Under a Nuclear Agreement with Iran”. Center for a New American Security. June 2015.
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available and easily accessible from Paris, France, where most of the research for this project 
was conducted.  
Upon further analysis of the research question, it became clear that the future of EU-Iran 
natural gas trade will depend upon several determinants: Private sector investment in both 
European and Iranian gas infrastructure, European Member State energy policy, and the ability 
for a nascent European Energy Union to organize, define and enforce regulatory measures that 
support the European Commission’s recently reaffirmed European Energy Strategy.  15
The findings indicate that in the short to medium term the high costs of infrastructure, the 
current precedence of Member State and private interests, and the current status of the Energy 
Union as a strategic initiative with limited legal mechanisms for exerting policy authority over 
the influential “great powers” described by Aalto and Temel will combine to limit rapid 
expansion of Iranian natural gas into the European energy market.  16
The sections that follow will begin by evaluating the opportunity Iran offers for the 
European natural gas market in light of the 2014 European Energy Strategy, evaluate the 
European gas market and move on to reviewing contemporary developments and foundations in 
European energy policy. It will then place the European Commission’s Three Energy Packages in 
context, assess key EU energy actors, and review the interests of both Iran and these actors prior 
to concluding.  
 Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “From the European Energy Community to the Energy Union: A Policy 15
Proposal for the Short and the Long Term,” Notre Europe.
 Pami Aalto and Dicle Korkmaz Temel, “European Energy Security: Natural gas and the Integration Process,” 16
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 4 (2013), 758-774, doi: 10.1111/jcms.12108.
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CHAPTER 1 
Iranian Natural Gas in the European Market: What can Iran offer? 
i. Iran’s Re-entry on the Global Energy Stage 
After years of negotiation between the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent 
members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) plus Germany and 
the European Union, the diplomatic milestone represented by the JCPOA is testing the EU’s 
ability to achieve a strategic goal and to diversify its sources of natural gas. Iran’s reopening 
energy market, presents an opportune time for an examination of the existing literature on the 
future of both Europe’s and Iran’s gas markets and an assessment of the factors that may affect 
how the EU engages Iran as a potential new source of supply.  
As the European Union works to ensure geopolitical security for its Member States, it is 
faced with the major challenge of reforming its approach to energy. However, the external factors 
that complicate such a task are many. A key factor is the dependence of Europe on Russia for 
over half the energy consumed in Europe while the continuing Ukraine conflict and the 
international fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq have raised European-Russian tension to the 
highest levels of the past two decades.   17
Another factor is that the strident climate-oriented goals undertaken by the EU are 
driving a focus to increase renewables in its energy mix. While these goals serve as an example 
 “Energy production and imports,” EuroStat, last updated April 7, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-17
explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports.
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for other major emitting regions, they also affect how EU Member States transition from other 
energy supply sources. Indeed, in order to demonstrate progress against the goals, it is widely 
anticipated that natural gas will serve as a transitory energy source, given it is cleaner than other 
fossil fuels.  18
ii. Iran’s Impressive Natural Gas Reserves 
 The world’s largest natural gas field, is shared between Iran and neighboring Qatar.  The 19
South Pars field contains almost 40 percent of Iran’s total natural gas reserves and has provided 
Iran an opportunity to expand its natural gas sector.  Despite economic sanctions related to its 20
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, Iran’s Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC) has managed 
to complete a majority of the 24-stage development plan to bring the field on-line.  Constrained 21
foreign investment and limited access to technology have impeded Iran from keeping up with 
projections for gas production growth in the South Pars field, which is located in the Persian 
Gulf off its southeastern coast.  However, the removal of sanctions is enabling development of 22
the energy sector, such as the National Iranian Oil Company’s (NIOC) recent announcement of a 
plan to deliver condensate to South Korea, signaling the Iranian government’s plans to accelerate 
South Pars production.  23
 “How much carbon dioxide is produced when different fuels are burned?”, Energy Information Administration, 18
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11.
 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008, IEA/OECD, 2008, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/19
International_Energy_Agency.
 Ibid.20
 “Iran,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 19, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/21
analysis.cfm?iso=IRN.
 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008. 22
 Rebecca Jang, “South Korea plans to boost Iran oil imports, especially condensate,” Reuters, March 2, 2016, 23
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-iran-oil-idUSKCN0W40P8.
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Iran’s natural gas reserves are impressive: according to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, it holds the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, and produced an 
estimated 5.7 trillion cubic feet (tcf, equivalent to 0.161 tcm) of dry natural gas in 2013.  The 24
potential for Iran’s market growth becomes clear when looking at other major natural gas-
producing countries that export to the European market. The world’s second-largest producer of 
natural gas behind the United States, Russia, produces 22.1 tcf (0.626 tcm) .  Norway, the 25
world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas behind Russia and home to Europe’s largest gas 
reserves, experienced a steady average increase in production between 1993 and 2014, when it 
produced over 3.8 tcf (0.096 tcm) of dry natural gas.  26
One of the primary goals of the EU’s Energy Union is to diversify natural gas supplies.  27
Given this specific priority, observers might expect that major European energy companies 
would be positioning to expeditiously sign contracts to build pipelines and liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) terminals in Europe and Iran following the adoption of JCPOA. The following sections 
will explore whether this is the case so far, and if not, why? 
iii. Projections & Competition 
 U.S. EIA estimates from 2013 show that the projected growth of Iran’s natural gas sector 
is strongest relative to other gas producers in the Middle East. The EIA predicts that Iran’s gas 
production will increase by 35.4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) by 2040.  Iran’s production growth is 28
 “Iran,” U.S. Energy Information Administration.24
 Ibid.25
 Ibid.26
 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council : European Energy Security 27
Strategy/COM/2014/0330 final,” European Commission. May 28, 2014. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0330.
 “Iran,” U.S. Energy Information Administration.28
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significant for several reasons, especially in comparison to that of neighboring Qatar, whose 
natural gas production is expected to grow by 4.9 tcf (0.139 tcm) by 2040. Iran’s South Pars and 
Qatar’s North Dome fields form a single joined reserve and place the nations in direct 
competition. Iran has gradually but steadily developed off-stream infrastructure for South Pars 
gas production, which places it at an advantage over Qatar. 
Iran’s natural gas development is also notably greater than that of any of its other 
neighbors in the Middle East, including of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, so the potential for Iran to 
profit from its historically friendly relationship with Europe is significant. In the 2000s, before 
the European Union imposed sweeping economic sanctions targeting energy resources and 
technology, Iran’s economic and trade relations with European countries were extensive. For 
example, Iran worked with France’s Total to explore and develop its reserves in South Pars, with 
UK financial institutions for support of foreign investments, and with Germany’s E.On on a LNG 
supply contract in 2007.  29
Iran’s neighbor Qatar primarily exports its gas in the form of LNG to partners, rather than 
by pipeline, and LNG faces increased competition and a potential global supply glut. LNG 
requires 600 times less space than its dry gas alternative. This compactness is can be a benefit for 
many countries with large reserves, such as the United States and Australia, that are 
geographically isolated from international markets. Qatar only began exporting LNG in 1997, 
and has since increased exports to current levels of around 20 percent of global LNG trade. 
However, those numbers are falling steadily as more countries develop their own LNG 
 Carola Hoyos, Daniel Dombey, and Ivar Simensen, “Eon pursues gas deal with Iran,” Foreign Times, 2007, http://29
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6642f912-cc51-11db-a661-000b5df10621.html?
ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz460hzuC5W.
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technology. Qatar’s global market share is expected to fall to near 12 percent by 2035 as North 
America and Australia are projected to flood the market with an abundance of LNG. Australia’s 
supply of LNG will represent 24 percent of the world market and the United States’ share will 
represent 12 percent.  Inevitably, Qatari LNG providers will face stiff competition and strong 30
pricing pressure from these new exporters. 
iv. Distribution Routes and Methods for Iranian natural gas 
 Unlike Qatar, Iran does not currently export LNG and consequently will likely avoid a 
major ramp of production and competition during the anticipated global LNG glut. Iran does, 
however, foresee a future for LNG as a way to engage in shorter-term contracts and to export to 
more geographically-distant partners, such as those in Europe and Asia. The first Iranian LNG 
terminal developed after sanctions relief is expected be complete around 2018.  
 Iran’s alternative to building an LNG infrastructure is the construction of more natural 
gas pipelines, or increased access to existing lines. According to Sohbet Karbuz, of the 
Mediterranean Energy Observatory, pipeline construction projects capital and time-intensive and 
are becoming less appealing to major producers of gas as the market expands to represent a 
wider consumer base more fit for LNG. However, Iranian policymakers and pipeline 
representatives have indicated the possibility of linking Iranian gas to new or existing pipeline 
projects for the European market. Furthermore, a representative for the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP), a project intended to carry gas from Azerbaijan to the EU and to connect with the Trans-
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) running through Turkey, expressed openness to embrace new 
shareholders, including Iran, in April 2015. In addition, Rovnag Abdullayev, president of 
 “Maritime Transportation: Implications of Using U.S. Liquefied-Natural-Gas Carriers for Exports,” U.S. 30
Government Accountability Office, December 2015, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673976.pdf.
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SOCAR, the Azeri state energy company, has been quoted saying, “If Iran has gas in the future, it 
won’t have [an]other option but to use TANAP pipeline to supply its gas to other markets.”   31
v. Iran’s Competition in the European Natural Gas Market 
 Iranian natural gas entering the European market through a pipeline like TAP and TANAP 
would imply competition with Azerbaijan, a growing supplier to the European market. Iranian 
gas could also be transported through TAP and TANAP to be sold on the international market – 
either to be shipped as LNG or to be stored for future resale or use. Sohbet Karbuz offered a 
perspective that diverged from the statements of TAP representatives and the SOCAR president 
by explaining that Azerbaijan is unlikely to welcome competition for the European gas market 
with Iran.  
Iran’s major competition will be Russia (39 percent of current consumption), Norway (33 
percent), and North Africa (mostly Algeria and Libya, which provide 22 percent). Competitive 
prices, established pipeline infrastructure, and geographic proximity make these countries 
favorable sourcing options for many EU Member States. However, the European Commission’s 
agenda to diversify its sources of energy consumption, secure its supply of natural gas, and 
specifically reduce dependence upon Russian energy may facilitate Iran’s access to the EU’s gas 
market.  
As described in the Introduction, the EU’s 20-20-20 Energy and Climate Package sets 
specific objectives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, expanding use of RES, and improving 
energy efficiency. In 2014, the European Commission also reaffirmed support for an Energy 
Union that intended to drive specific priorities to diversifying sources of energy, and specifically, 
 EurActiv.com with Reuters, “TAP pipeline open to other shareholders, including Iran,” Euractiv,.com, April 9, 31
2015, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/tap-pipeline-open-to-other-shareholders-including-iran/.
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natural gas supply.The Commission’s intent on building a successful Energy Union reinforces the 
potential for Iran as a feasible alternative natural gas supplier to satisfy Europe’s future energy 
needs. 
 !7
CHAPTER 2 
A New European Strategy: Diversification 
i. Natural Gas as a Transitional Energy Source 
Natural gas is the subject of much discussion as the European Commission pushes 
forward its European Energy Union plans. A question often raised by academics, policy makers 
and environmental advocates observing the Energy Union is why natural gas has taken the front 
seat in many of the Commission’s legislative proposals. For example, Europe is making 
significant progress in implementing RES. However, the Commission is looking to natural gas as 
a relatively clean, more immediately accessible fuel source as coal and heavy oils are gradually 
phased out to meet 20-20-20 goals. Though it is a fossil fuel, it pollutes much less than 
petroleum when burned and has a growing base of reliable consumers worldwide as the power 
industry moves away from electricity produced from coal. Furthermore, this positions natural gas 
as transitional fuel to greener energies such as solar and wind.  
 IEA projections estimate that European natural gas imports will grow by one third 
between 2014 and 2020, largely due to falling domestic production and an increased demand 
from the power sector as coal is phased out.   32
 Europe’s import of natural gas via pipelines that connect producers to consumers in EU 
Member States has enabled countries such as Germany and Italy to meet their energy demands 
 Domestic production of natural gas in Europe will fall 25 percent between 2010 and 2020, according to the IEA’s 32
Gas Medium-Term Market Report 2015. The report analyses natural gas production, consumption, and market 
trends until 2020. International Energy Agency, “Gas Medium Term Report 2015: Executive Summary,” IEA/OECD, 
2015, https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2015SUM.pdf.
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with a (usually) secure and steady supply of gas. Distribution of Russian gas via pipeline 
throughout the EU has, at least temporarily, enabled Member States to make progress on their 
environmental goals . On the other hand, Europe’s continued heavy reliance upon natural gas 
imports from Russia complicates Europe’s leverage in cases of geopolitical tension with that 
nation. The Commission has therefore prioritized diversification as a key element of its energy 
policy for Europe.  
ii. LNG: Presenting Opportunities for Europe to Diversify 
The European Commission’s Energy Security Strategy highlights the growing liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) market as the EU’s best chance at developing a diverse set of suppliers. New 
developments across the globe have entered EU-level discussions on energy policy and strategy 
planning. These include the phenomena of increased LNG production in Australia, Canada, the 
United States, and Qatar, as well as new gas discoveries in East Africa and Israel.  
iii. Diversification as a Pillar of the European Energy Security Strategy 
As discussed earlier, European Energy Union received a renewed endorsement from the 
European Commission in 2014 that also refreshed earlier 20-20-20 commitments that 
immediately followed the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon also made significant 
contributions to the EU policymaking process by implementing shared energy competences 
between the EU and Member States. The Ukraine-Russian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 – two 
examples of Russia interrupting gas transit through Ukraine – reinforced the Commission’s 
interest in developing a common energy security strategy.  
That strategy came to life as the European Commission’s Energy Security Strategy was 
published in May 2014 – in advance of a third Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis the following 
 !9
winter.  The Strategy focuses on developing short and long-term solutions for securing 33
European energy resources through diversification, coordination among Member States and with 
energy industry stakeholders, improving efficiency in energy use and distribution, and 
coordinating European markets, policies, and infrastructure.  
The diversification clauses of the 2014 Energy Security Strategy emphasize a focus on 
natural gas with which the EU has addressed its international partners. For example, the 
European Commission’s statement to G20 participants in 2014 emphasizes the EU’s focus on the 
“development of flexible, transparent, and competitive energy markets, including gas markets” 
and explains that it will pursue “a more integrated LNG market, including through new supplies, 
the development of transport infrastructures, storage capacities, and LNG terminals.”  Finally, 34
with particular relevance for Europe’s relationship with potential energy partners like Iran, the 
Commission supports “the opening of new routes to supply energy, in particular the Southern 
Corridor, as a route for possible other sources of supply for Europe.”   35
The European Commission identifies Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Georgia and 
Turkey as countries of this “Southern Corridor” who are engaged in natural gas supply, transit 
and pipeline projects as it considers how to alleviate the fact that “many countries in Central and 
South East Europe are dependent on a single supplier”.  36
 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council : European Energy Security 33
Strategy/COM/2014/0330 final,” European Commission.
 “G7 Rome Energy Ministerial Meeting: Energy Initiative for Energy Security Joint Statement,” European 34
Commission, May 6, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-530_en.htm.
 “Press Release: Rome G7 Energy Initiative for Energy Security Joint Statement,” European Commission, 6 May 35
2014, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-530_en.htm.
 “Gas and oil supply routes,” European Commission, last updated April 25, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/36
topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/gas-and-oil-supply-routes. 
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The importance that the EU has placed upon energy resource diversification, particularly 
in the Southern Corridor, and Europe’s eagerness to build infrastructure to facilitate natural gas 
flows through the region, create an environment in which new avenues can be explored to ensure 
security of supply. The 2014 Energy Security Strategy also specifically proposes “other 
countries” as future partners: “Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran, if conditions are met to lift the 
sanctions regime, could…significantly contribute to the enlargement of the Southern Gas 
Corridor.”  37
 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council : European Energy Security 37
Strategy/COM/2014/0330 final,” European Commission.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Structure of the Natural Gas Market in the European Union 
  
The current EU internal market in gas and electricity is “characterized by an insufficient 
level of interconnections” which translates to significant price differences in natural gas, a waste 
of resources, and the persistence of energy islands within the EU such as the Iberian Peninsula, 
the Baltic states, the UK and Ireland.  38
To place the structure of natural gas markets in perspective, a review of current 
production, consumption and pricing trends is useful. 
i. Natural Gas in the EU: Production & Consumption 
 The European Commission’s Energy Strategy of 2014 frames its energy security goals by 
emphasizing a shift away from a supply focus toward a demand focus. This is crucial as it 
considers the security of a single resource or the security of all energy resources consumed. The 
European Union has developed a diverse energy mix, which both benefits and complicates its 
energy security strategy. The current mix includes coal, which has long been produced 
domestically in great quantities; oil, imported from across the globe; renewable energy, which 
EU countries have been able to produce and distribute with increasing success in recent years; 
and natural gas, produced domestically but decreasingly so, causing EU countries to import more 
to satisfy demand. 
 Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “From the European Energy Community to the Energy Union: A Policy 38
Proposal for the Short and the Long Term,” Notre Europe, January 2015. http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/
energyunion-andouravinois-jdi-jan15.pdf?pdf=ok.
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 Natural gas accounts for one-quarter of the EU’s energy mix, and sixty percent of that 
amount is imported.  This is a key element of the aforementioned European Energy Strategy. 39
The Strategy seeks a future market structure supported by policies that help diversify European 
energy sources, reinforce regulatory measures, and facilitate resolution of energy interests shared 
by the EU as an institution and its Member States. European natural gas demand has recently 
experienced less upward pressure than anticipated by energy experts in long-term projections of 
a decade or so ago. Energy experts Rodrigo Pinto-Scholtbach of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) International Energy Agency (IEA) and Thomas 
Pellerin-Carlin of Notre Europe both point to warm winters as a major factor contributing to 
recent reductions in European natural gas consumption. According to a study published by the 
Oxford Energy Institute, natural gas demand in Europe will fall between 2010 and 2020 from 
594 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 564 bcm.  40
 However, longer-term projections indicate increased demand: The same report predicts 
that gas demand will reach 618 bcm in 2030, or a 0.19 percent increase per year.  According to 41
the IEA, the share of unconventional gas (e.g., LNG) in the EU’s domestic production will 
optimistically reach 47 percent by 2035, representing less than 12 percent of demand and 30 bcm 
at best. Even if Europe is able to develop the appropriate infrastructure to easily convert and 
consume these reserves at will, the EU will maintain import dependence at around 60 percent - 
 “EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook,” European Commission, 2012.39
 Anouk Honoré, “The Outlook for Natural Gas Demand in Europe,” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 40
2014, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NG-87.pdf.
 Ibid.41
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the status quo.  With these projections, the European Energy Strategy objective of 42
diversification of natural gas supply faces risk. 
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports a 2.3 percent decrease in OECD Europe’s 
overall natural gas production between 2014 and 2015.  Decreased production in The 43
Netherlands, a primary producer and supplier to the EU market, was particularly marked in 2015, 
indicating a 27 percent drop (see Figure 1).  The initial European response to decreasing 44
domestic production coupled with increasing demand is focused on identifying substitutes for 
gas, including coal and RES. However, while coal is considered an abundant, cheap, and easily 
transportable resource, replacing gas with coal would prevent EU Member States from achieving 
one of their primary targets for the year 2020 - to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
increased use of RES would indeed contribute to the EU’s realization of its goals, as it seeks to 
use RES for 20 percent of its energy consumption by 2020. However, the development of 
renewable technology and the distribution of renewable energy has not yet advanced to the point 
where future increases can fully replace gas demand. 
 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive Summary,” 2012. http://www.iea.org/42
publications/freepublications/publication/English.pdf.
 International Energy Agency, “Key Gas Trends 2015-Based on Monthly Data”, last updated April 2016, OECD/43
IEA. http://www.iea.org/media/statistics/Keygastrends2015.pdf.
 Ibid.44
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Figure 1: Absolute change and percentage change in natural gas production in OECD, 
2014-2015 
ii. Prices and Trading 
 Currently, gas trading and pricing in Europe takes place on a regional basis, as the 
production and distribution of natural gas is still a relatively centralized around a pipeline 
infrastructure and will continue to be until LNG, a much more mobile form of gas, becomes 
increasingly popular. Typically, this has meant that natural gas prices generally do not vary 
drastically from country to country. Between 2008 and 2014, the average household consumer 
price stayed between 8-9 Eurocent per kilowatt hour (Eurocent/kWh). The wholesale gas market, 
where producers, traders, and consumers buy and sell gas, is run and operated across the 
 !15
European continent from various natural gas marketplaces or hubs. A hub is not necessarily at a 
pipeline junction where large amounts of gas are physically transported across borders, though 
those do exist (e.g., CEGH in Austria and Zeebrugge in Belgium). Virtual hubs, or standard sets 
of natural gas delivery points, are more common today. Examples include NBP, TTF, Gaspool, 
NCG, PSV, the PEG and TIGF.  45
 The European natural gas market is a part of the larger international market. In theory, 
private companies are able to operate freely across the globe allow prices to remain competitive 
and energy resources like natural gas to be distributed across wide expanses. In some ways, gas 
delivery via pipeline from Russia to Germany and via LNG shipping containers from Algeria to 
France and the UK are examples of this. However, when Member States, supplier states or 
private corporations geopolitical or economic interests result in pricing anomalies or supply 
disruption, the European market is adversely impacted. 
 European Commission, “Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets,” Q3, 2015, Market Observatory for Energy, 45
DG Energy, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly-gas_q3_2014_final.pdf.
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CHAPTER 4 
European Union Energy Policy: Contemporary Developments 
i. The Role of EU Institutions in the Energy Union 
The European Commission’s primary struggles for an effective Energy Union include 
leveraging its own competences while respecting those of Member States as well as proposing 
policies that continue to ensure competition among producer and utility companies as well as 
transmission system operators (TSOs). The Commission follows the logic that “competitive 
energy markets and prices are expected to benefit consumers and promote global 
competitiveness of the EU economy.” The Commission and its fellow institutions have reiterated 
this logic on numerous occasions in recent energy policy proposals and directives, in alignment 
with the EU’s objective to bring to implement a fully operating and successful internal market.  
 The role of the European Commission in proposing legislation and, once approved by the 
Parliament and Council, implementing and enforcing it has increased since the adoption of the 
2009 Treaty of Lisbon by EU Member States and institutions. The Treaty of Lisbon was the 
instrument that called for establishing the internal market, for consolidating EU foreign policy 
responsibilities, and for giving the EU shared energy policymaking competences with Member 
States. It is explained in greater detail in a later section outlining a trajectory of EU energy 
policy. Despite increased influence of governmental institutions, the private sector, which is 
heavily represented by energy firms and their interest groups, is still the paramount actor in 
European gas trade. As this is likely to remain the case, the EU’s concept for establishing an 
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energy security regime and internal energy market - the European Energy Union - has been 
focused on facilitating cooperative engagement on energy between Member States, the private 
sector, and European institutions. 
 Europe’s combined need for a diversified collection of natural gas suppliers, for a better 
coordinated natural gas market among EU Member States and their partners, and for a common 
security agenda are a few of the major contributing factors to the Commission’s push for a 
European Energy Union.  
 The idea came from one of the ‘fathers of Europe’, former President of the European 
Commission Jacques Delors, who advocated that the EU countries so wishing should begin 
without delay to embark on a common energy policy. He suggested they develop ambitious 
economic instruments to finance common research and development projects for alternative 
energy sources; deepen cooperation on Europe-wide energy networks, and set up oil and gas 
purchasing groups to facilitate procurement from foreign suppliers while fortifying European 
foreign policy efforts in this field.  
 On 25 February 2015, the European Commission took further action toward its energy 
community and climate goals by presenting its Energy Union proposal, “A Framework Strategy 
for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy.” The document 
was more ambitious and thorough than preceding proposals in addressing how the EU - Member 
States and private stakeholders included - should move forward. In particular, it calls upon EU 
actors to achieve a “fundamental transformation” of the European energy system and to “move 
away from an economy driven by fossil fuels, an economy where energy is based on a 
centralised, supply-side approach and which relies on old technologies and outdated business 
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models.” The Framework Strategy proposal highlights a “fragmented system characterised by 
uncoordinated national policies, market barriers and energy-isolated areas” by empowering 
consumers “through providing them with information, choice and through creating flexibility to 
manage demand as well as supply.”  46
 While EU energy policy had progressed since the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission’s 
continues to face challenges implementing energy governance and coping with ongoing 
bilateralism. 
ii. Energy Governance 
 The Commission and its fellow EU institutions’ competences inhibit them from requiring 
Member State participation in proposed or ill-enforced energy efforts.  
 One example is the aftermath of the gas disruption of January 2009, which prompted the 
fortunate adoption of the EU regulation on security of gas supply and led to the implementation 
of EU Member State standards and a common EU framework for precautionary measures in case 
of disruption. Though the framework for the security of natural gas supply is under the purview 
of the European Union (the Commission in particular), there is much work to be done in the 
coordination of pipeline networks, implementation of unbundling requirements (the division of 
companies’ production and distribution sectors) and monitoring of supplies and consumption. 
There are a few institutions responsible for these activities, such as the Agency for Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Network of Transmission System Operators for gas 
 European Commission, “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate 46
Change Policy/COM/2015/080 final,” Official Journal of the European Union, 2015. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2015%3A80%3AFIN.
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(ENTSO-G), and the Gas Coordination Group, but these organizations lack significant 
enforcement power.  
 A 2014 report by think tank Notre Europe found that “lack of compliance [with 
Commission Energy Union policies] is too frequent. Notre Europe attributed the problem to the 
EU energy proposals “leaving policy formulation and implementation to the individual EU 
Member States, who do so in divergent ways.”  As a result, the European Court of Justice 47
pursued 567 of 1,300, or nearly 44 percent, of infringement procedures against Member States in 
the environment, internal market, and energy sectors in 2013.  48
iii. Bilateralism 
In the Introduction, this paper cited the challenge posed by bilateralism and the concept 
of “great power”. This ‘bilateralism’ is an effect of EU Member States’ practice of their 
sovereign right to choose their own energy supplies and mix, and to distribute their own energy 
resources as they wish. As Aalto and Temel explain, it is a historically developed practice of 
realizing security of supplies for most EU Member States, and it explains what drives wealthy 
and politically powerful countries like Germany to foster its own natural gas partnerships.24 A 
perfect example of “great power” in conflict with EU institutional interests is that of German-
Russian energy diplomacy, which led to the development of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline 
connecting the two countries directly for the first time. The Nord Stream project, initiated after 
the 2006 interruption of natural gas flows from Russia through Ukraine due to regional tensions, 
was gradually supported by France’s GDF Suez and Denmark’s Gasunie, making it a multilateral 
 Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “De la communauté européenne de l’énergie à l’Union de l’énergie : Une 47
proposition politique pour le court et le long terme,” Notre Europe.
 Ibid.48
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project of private companies seeking profit. It was not, however, supported by EU institutions 
because its mission to bypass Ukraine compromised EU principles of maintaining solidarity with 
neighboring energy partners. 
 As an extension of the “great power” issue, there is also the challenge of private 
European energy companies acting neither in the interest of the EU as a whole, nor of the EU 
Member State from which they operate. In this case, private companies follow their own interest 
of making profitable deals in the free market. According to IEA natural gas expert Rodrigo Pinto-
Scholtbach, the instability of the European natural gas market has caused private companies to 
pursue alternative projects to those supported by the European Commission.  Nord Stream 2, an 49
extension of the 2006 Nord Stream project, serves as an example: It is a plan between Russia’s 
Gazprom and a consortium of primarily German energy companies such as E.On Ruhrgas and 
BASF Wintershall to expand the already politically sensitive pipeline supplying significant 
quantities of Russian gas to Germany.  
 The Treaty of Lisbon succeeded in combining energy competences between Member 
States and EU institutions, committing Member States to the “20-20-20” targets of a 20 percent 
share of renewables, 20 percent increase in energy efficiency and 20 percent lower greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2020, and to enabling better Member State and EU coordination on external 
energy relations. However, the EU has thus far been unable to overcome the dominant 
“Westphalian sovereignty” model driving Member State behavior on energy policy and practice. 
According to a report on the capability of the Commission’s Framework Strategy proposal to 
continue building an Energy Union by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the weakness of 
 Rodrigo Pinto-Scholtbach (IEA natural gas specialist), interview by Lily S. Emamian, March 2016.49
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the EU in its ability to reign in the great powers’ authority may make the Energy Union project 
“hard to deliver.”  50
iv. Cooperation between Institutions, Member States, and Private Stakeholders 
 Despite valid critiques of the EU’s ability to carry out its policies and recommendations, 
EU institutions are confident in the Commission’s progress on the Energy Union.  Certain 51
Member States and EU citizens are also supportive and optimistic of the Energy Union’s future. 
72 percent of Europeans are reportedly in favor of a common energy policy.  Member States’ 52
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which made energy a shared competency, meant that for the 
first time they “accepted to consider their own infrastructures in a regional context for the 
common interest” of other regions and countries in their neighborhood.  Jan Frederik Braun 53
expresses belief in the EU’s gradual development of a cohesive energy policymaking process and 
the development of a wider area of shared competences with Member States. He names three 
major trends that will contribute to the success of the Energy Union: A revised role of authorities 
and the division of those roles, the increasing importance of confidence building and personal 
relations between the institutions, and the differing of perceptions within institutions of the post-
 Pami Aalto and Dicle Korkmaz Temel, “European Energy Security: Natural gas and the Integration Process,” 50
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies.
 “Fact Sheet: State of the Energy Union - questions and answers, MEMO/15/6106,” European Commission, 51
November 18, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6106_en.htm.
 European Commission, “Public Opinion in the European Union: First Results,” Standard Eurobarometer 83, July 52
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf.
 Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, “From the European Energy Community to the Energy Union: A Policy 53
Proposal for the Short and the Long Term,” Notre Europe.
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Lisbon political landscape. In short, the EU’s already-proven adaptability in the scope of energy 
policy will help the Commission in its pursuit of an Energy Union.  54
 The European Commission’s future plans will determine the EU’s ability to continue 
pushing for an Energy Union in 2016. The EU’s mechanisms to implement its current policies in 
the natural gas market as we know it today, the EU’s future plans for energy policy and natural 
gas projects, and Iran’s potential contributions to European natural gas in the context of the 
Energy Union will be discussed at length in the pages that follow. 
 Jan Frederik Braun, “EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a new policy and business as 54
usual,” European Policy Institutes Network, Working Paper No. 31, February 2011, https://www.ceps.eu/system/
files/book/2011/02/EPIN%20WP31%20Braun%20on%20EU%20Energy%20Policy%20under%20Lisbon.pdf.
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CHAPTER 5 
European Energy Policy: Foundations 
i. EU Treaties and Competences: Institutions in place for a common natural gas strategy 
 By describing the foundational treaties of the European Union, this section seeks to 
provide necessary background on the mechanisms enabling current efforts to develop a common 
European strategy that regulates the European energy market through economically reasonable, 
democratically transparent, and strategically secure policies. The EU’s overriding objective is to 
ensure its citizens’ well-being through a strong and effective Union. Though regulation of natural 
gas became an EU institutional priority fairly recently, the Commission’s focus on gas as a key 
resource in the successful implementation of a comprehensive European Energy Union has a 
compelling and successful precedent: The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).   55
 The components of a functioning pan-European economic alliance have evolved, and 
today they include new kinds of industry and alternative forms of energy. The European 
Community has also expanded to embrace new members, and the nature of foreign relations 
between European Member States and their neighbors has changed to reflect a much different 
world order than the one understood by European leaders in the post-World War II era. 
 European Commission, “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” Official Journal of the 55
European Union, 1951, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0022
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ii. 1952: The European Coal and Steel Community 
 At the foundation of the ever-evolving European Union is the Treaty establishing the 
ECSC, a document that united France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg during the reconstruction of Europe following World War II. Signed in Paris in 
1951, it brought these countries together with the aim of organizing the free movement of coal 
and steel across borders and to enable participating countries to have easy access to sources of 
production. The intention of ECSC’s creators, who are considered today to be the founding 
members of the European Community, was for the Treaty to also engender diplomatic, political, 
and economic unity among participating countries and to serve as an incentive for solidarity and 
cooperation on the European continent in the aftermath of yet another costly war. At the time, 
reconstructing the economies and infrastructure of Europe was a priority among leaders like 
France’s Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet, and Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who, 
as three of the EU’s founding fathers, led the reconstruction of France and Germany. By 
establishing a common market for the exchange of these profitable raw materials, which 
represented the nexus of European industry and energy, they managed to enact a treaty in 1950, 
valid for 50 years until 2002, implementing a common market for coal, iron ore, scrap, and steel.  
 Though much has changed since, several factors that originally brought together 
European nations have remained the same: A focus on maintaining a common, and integrated, 
market of European goods and services; a shared interest in projecting unity in major foreign 
policy decisions, particularly those that address affairs with large and powerful nations; and 
finally a mutual commitment to democracy and a shared spirit of promoting transparency 
between Member States for policies that best serve the European people. To build a Europe that 
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maintains the integrity of each of these foundational goals, EU institutions have embraced the 
challenge of integrating their respective national energy strategies. 
 The Treaty establishing ECSC led not only to the economic union of two major 
industries; it also established institutions for pan-European governance, much like the European 
Commission, Council, Parliament, Council of Ministers, and Court of Justice as we know them 
today. They were: The High Authority, whose role it was to achieve the Treaty’s objectives; an 
Assembly, to represent the national Parliaments of each Member State; a Council of Ministers, 
consisting of six representatives from the national governments of each Member State; and a 
Court of Justice, consisting of seven judges nominated to ensure implementation of the law and 
proper interpretation of the Treaty.  These institutions provided European nations with the 56
context for cooperation on a host of issues concerning not only their economic recovery and 
development, but also their place in international affairs in the long-term.  
 The High Authority had legal oversight over the European institutions and the ability to 
enforce Treaty rules by imposing fines against, for example, companies who failed to report coal 
production numbers or Member States who tolerated unfair competitive or discriminatory 
practices. Led by the High Authority, institutions were able to enforce policies to monitor and 
support Member State activities in the coal and steel industries. These regulations covered 
information sharing, production forecasting, funding and investment, infrastructure, price fixing, 
competition, and wages and the movement of workers.  
 European Commission, “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” Official Journal of the 56
European Union.
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iii. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 
 On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon went into effect after approval by the 
European Parliament and Council and unanimous adoption by Member States.  The initial 57
legislation proposed by the European Commission in the lead-up to Parliamentary approval and 
Member State ratification spoke of a constitution for Europe.  The concept of a constitution 58
caused several national governments - most notably France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Spain -  hold referendums in 2005, clinging to their principles of state sovereignty.  Though 59
France and Luxembourg’s final rejection of the treaty led to its ultimate failure to become EU 
policy, the debate it caused enabled EU Member States to reflect upon alternatives that granted 
the EU a more resonant voice on the global stage. In search of a cohesive set of policy guidelines 
to enhance cooperation and communication between EU institutions and Member States, as well 
with its partners in the international community, European leaders went back to the drawing table 
to construct the Lisbon Treaty.  
 The Lisbon Treaty granted shared competences between institutions and Member States 
in more domains than before including the internal market, environment, and energy. The 
distinctions between these competences are outlined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
 European Commission, “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 57
European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union.
 European Commission, “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,” Official Journal of the European Union, 58
October 29, 2004, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/
treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf. 
 Finn Laursen, Historical Dictionary of the European Union, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 219.59
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and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which replaced the 2002 
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), also known as the Treaty of Nice.  60
 The changes agreed upon at Lisbon reformed internal EU policies, strengthened external 
policies and redefined rules concerning the composition of the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
They also reformed voting from a weighted system to one requiring a qualified majority vote 
(QMV) of the Parliament and Council to adopt a legislative act - a regulation, directive, or 
decision - in a process called the ordinary legislative procedure.  This change is a significant 61
victory for EU institutional decision-making, which relied most frequently upon Member State 
unanimity for approval of legislative decisions. When unanimity is required, each Member State 
has the power to block an EU legislative action by voting against the matter at hand. When QMV 
applies, however, as is the case for energy policy decision-making in accordance with Article 194 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (described at length in the following 
subsection), EU action can be taken over the objection of a Member State.   62
 The Lisbon Treaty also established the basis for two new leadership positions. The first, 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acts simultaneously as Vice 
President of the Commission and presides over decision making for foreign and diplomatic 
 European Commission, “Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated version 2002),” Official 60
Journal of the European Union, 2002, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12002E
%2FTXT.
 European Commission, “Articles 294 and 289, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 61
Treaty establishing the European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union.
 European Commission, “Article 194, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 62
establishing the European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union, 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E194:EN:HTML; Stephen C. Sieberson, “Inching Toward EU 
Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon,” Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 50, 4, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664069.
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issues facing the EU. The second position, President of the European Council, is intended to set 
the EU’s agenda and political direction, to promote cooperation among Member States and with 
the Commission, and to represent the EU externally on foreign and security issues in the same 
vein as the High Representative. 
 Each new element for which the Lisbon Treaty is responsible - particularly those dealing 
with foreign policy, security of supply, trans-European networks, and the internal market - set the 
stage for the European Commission to reign in enough authority and bargaining power with 
Member States to begin building toward the European Energy Union. Figure 2 below illustrates 
specific directives and communications implemented after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force 
that contribute to the growth of the EU energy policymaking and the gradual growth of the 
Energy Union. 
Figure 2: Post-Lisbon Energy Accomplishments of the European Commission  63
Field of Policy Communication/
Directive
Objective Date of Adoption 
Foreign Policy COM(2011) 539, i.e. 
On the security of 
energy supply and 
international 
cooperation - EU 
energy policy: 
Engaging with 
partners beyond our 
borders
Further crossborder 
cooperation on the 
part of the EU with 
neighboring 
countries; wider 
regulatory area; 
regular information
7 September 2011
 Information collected primarily from the European Parliament. Balázs Mellár, “Energy policy: general 63
principles,” European Parliament, last updated March 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/
displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.1.html. 
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Security of Supply Regulation (EU) No 
994/2010 concerning 
measures to safeguard 
the security of the gas 
supply
Strengthening 
prevention and crisis 
response mechanisms; 
maintenance of oil 
stocks; development 
of emergency and 
preventive action 
plans
20 October 2010
Trans-European 
Networks
Regulation (EU) No 
347/2013, i.e. The 
Regulation on 
Guidelines for Trans-
European Energy 
Infrastructure
Establishes projects of 
common interest to 
the European 
Commission and 
Member States and 
means of 
infrastructure for the 
most efficient 
functioning of the 
European energy 
market
17 April 2013
Internal Market Regulation (EU) No 
1227/2011, i.e. 
Regulation on 
Wholesale Energy 
market Integrity and 
Transparency
A main legislative 
instrument aiming to 
contribute to the 
better functioning of 
the internal energy 
market
4 February 2011
Field of Policy Communication/
Directive
Objective Date of Adoption 
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 In fact, the Commission was prepared from the beginning of its negotiations for a Treaty 
amending the European Community to have included and retained an energy policymaking 
mechanism - Article 194 in TFEU. Upon closer examination of the Lisbon Treaty as a whole, its 
components indicate a calculated approach from the Commission for improving EU oversight 
over energy policy, and of the foreign and financial affairs that trail it. 
iv. Article 194 and its Consequences 
 While unification of EU Member States’ energy markets has long been in the works, a 
single phrase in Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon is an indicator of the influence that national 
governments still have in charting their own course in energy policy. That same phrase may, 
however, also have set the stage for a wave of institutional change to come, making it the most 
significant enabler for implementing a comprehensive EU energy policy thus far. 
 “In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, 
in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy 
market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and 
energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.”  64
 In short, Article 194 pairs the EU’s prioritization of energy policy with the importance of 
a properly-functioning internal market, reiterates an institutional focus on pursuing 
environmentally-conscious approaches and solidarity among EU Member States, and grants the 
Commission exclusive competence on trade and investment negotiations for bilateral trade talks. 
With most of these initiatives in place long before 2009, the EU’s effort to institutionalize energy 
policy at the EU level – vis-à-vis an Energy Union or not – has its roots in the last century. 
 European Commission, “Article 194, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 64
establishing the European Community,” Official Journal of the European Union.
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CHAPTER 6 
Long-term Energy Market Liberalization and the EU’s Implementation of the Three 
Energy Packages 
i. Market Liberalization 
Looking back at the 1952 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), it is clear that establishing a functioning internal market was then a priority among 
European leaders. At that time the European Community was composed of just six Member 
States and there were fewer industries dominated by fewer companies. However, integration and 
liberalization of the coal and steel markets was the High Authority’s strategy to guide post-WWII 
economic recovery in Europe. Between 1952 and 1960, after less than ten years, the Community 
was responsible for a 75 percent increase in iron and steel production and a 58 percent rise in 
industrial production. Though coal was overshadowed by alternative fuel sources soon after 
implementation, the ECSC helped Member States gradually reduce coal production and to 
prepare miners for work in new industries.  65
ii. The Legal Mechanisms of EU Energy Policy  
Common Rules for the Internal Market in 1998 
 The 1952 Treaty establishing ECSC was given a fifty-year lifetime and granted the 
European Commission the opportunity to renew it. The Commission thus released in 1998 a 
 European Commission, “Expiry of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty: an overview, 65
MEMO/02/145” Official Journal of the European Union, June 19, 2002, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-02-145_en.htm.
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directive - the first of three energy initiatives - to achieve market liberalization of the natural gas 
sector in advance of ECSC’s 2002 expiration date.  
 The initiative set the stage for two additional energy packages, whose collective objective 
it was to ensure a smooth transition from outdated EU energy regulation to energy policy that 
delivered “real choice for all consumers of the European Union, be they citizens or business”, to 
provide “new business opportunities and more cross-border trade” to achieve gains in energy 
efficiency, to make prices more competitive, to enhance service standards, and to contribute to 
security of supply and sustainability.”  This first step in a marathon effort by the Commission to 66
liberalize European gas in 2000, Directive 98/30/EC was preliminary measure that set 
expectations for future policy.  It was established with the objectives of resolving the inherent 67
conflict of interests between producers, suppliers, and network operators, maintaining security of 
supply, ensuring equitable access to the network for new entrants and a choice of suppliers for 
consumers, and achieving market transparency.  
New Guidelines for Suppliers and Consumers in 2003 
The market liberalization directive was soon followed by the second energy package 
which, released in June 2003, consisted of a regulation and two directives on gas (2003/54/EC) 
and electricity (2003/55/EC).  Once entered into force in 2004 and 2007, respectively, these 68
directives granted citizens of the EU “inter alia, the free movement of goods, the freedom of 
 European Parliament, Council of the European Union, “Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the 66
internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 
13, 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0073.
 European Parliament and the Council, “Directive 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 67
natural gas,” Official Journal of The European Union, July 21, 1998, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998L0030:EN:HTML.
 “The 3rd Energy Package,” Observatoire du gaz, http://www.gasinfocus.com/en/focus/the-3rd-energy-package/. 68
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establishment, and the freedom to provide services.” According to this second legislative 
package, the opportunities it seeks to provide are only achievable in a fully open market that 
allows consumers to choose their suppliers and suppliers to serve customers, uninhibited by 
restrictions imposed by supplying countries or companies. Since this second round of natural gas 
market liberalization, EU Member States have been required to establish independent regulators 
to monitor aspects of their gas markets such as pricing and consumption levels. EU countries 
have also been required to grant nondiscriminatory, third-party access to their natural gas 
markets through legal unbundling of transport from trading. The two directives composing the 
second energy package also implemented a regulatory body, the the European Regulators’ Group 
for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), in 2003. In short, the second energy package enabled natural 
gas consumers and suppliers more choice by opening the market and implementing the 
regulatory measures to ensure that consumers could choose confidently. 
Market Liberalization in 2009 
 The implementation of the first two energy packages of 1998 and 2003 were a symbolic 
victory for the European Commission and its partner institutions, the Parliament and the Council, 
in the institutions’ long-term mission to build a strong policy securing the EU’s supply of natural 
gas and other energy resources. They also symbolized the Commission’s reinforcement of the 
internal market and its liberalization of that market. However, the EU institutions would not have 
a true victory if the legislative packages did not come with teeth. The effectiveness of 
liberalization legislation was at a loss without the regulatory measures to keep it running 
effectively and fairly.  
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 To solve this issue, the Commission issued a Communication in 2007 titled “An Energy 
Policy for Europe.”  It emphasized the importance of establishing a level playing field for all 69
natural gas affairs and declared that “there must be a clearer separation between the management 
of gas and electricity networks and production or sales activities.”  Without equal access to the 70
natural gas market across Member States and the effective unbundling of production and supply, 
the Communication reported, there was still a risk of Member States engaging in discriminatory 
natural gas contracts, or even ones that violated the EU’s earlier legislation. 
 The Third Energy Package sought to resolve the issues associated with diversification 
and regulation that its precedents had not. To keep companies honest, it required natural gas 
producers and suppliers to split up. Referred to as “ownership unbundling,” the initiative was 
meant to allow companies only one undertaking - production or supply. According to the Third 
Energy Package, unbundling “should be effective in removing any conflict of interests between 
producers, suppliers and transmission system operators…and should not create an overly onerous 
regulatory regime for national regulatory authorities.”  71
 In its second major contribution to liberalization and market integration of European 
natural gas, the Third Package established a series of regulatory agencies. The ERGEG, the 
regulatory institution established in the second energy directive, already served as a kind of pan-
European regulatory body responsible for ensuring cooperation between national regulators and 
Member States’ coherent application of the internal market directives. The third package added a 
 “An Energy Policy for Europe, COMM(2001) 1 final” The European Commission, January 10, 2007, http://eur-69
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al27067. 
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supplementary regulatory body in order to give supplier and producer companies another choice 
of monitoring agency to which to report: The European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER). Similar to its older counterpart, ACER launched in March 2011 and serves 
as a supervisory and advisory body. It is primarily responsible for promoting cooperation 
between national regulatory authorities and EU-level regulators, keeping up with the 10-year 
network development plans and their progress, and monitoring the internal markets of natural gas 
and electricity. In the same vein, the third package established the European Network 
Transmission Systems Operator for natural gas which, in cooperation with ACER, is responsible 
for developing standard access rules and technical codes, to ensure cooperation among networks 
(whether for pipelines or LNG routes), and to set common safety and emergency standards and 
procedures.  
 Thanks to the partnership between the natural gas regulatory authority for ENTSO and 
ACER, the Commission adopted the first EU-wide network code on cross-border capacity 
allocation, which indicates progress toward an open and free natural gas market between 
European Member States and partners. 
 The third package established two final sets of measures, one for security of natural gas 
supply (as well as for electricity and oil), and a series of guidelines for trans-European energy 
networks that identifies a series of projects of common European interest. To ensure security of 
supply, Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 requires Member States to implement infrastructure 
standards to satisfy total gas demand.  In case of supply disruption, the regulation requires 72
 European Parliament and European Council, Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard 72
security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC,” Official Journal of the European, October 20, 
2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32010R0994.
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certain Member States to maintain reverse-flow capacity of their natural gas pipelines, and sets 
general supply standards in exceptional cases of possible interruption such as extreme weather 
conditions, exceptionally high demand, or disruption of a country’s single largest gas 
infrastructure. The regulation also requires Member States to share market information, to 
develop risk assessments, and to set emergency plans and crisis levels. With the guidance of the 
Gas Coordination Group, an advisory resource for Member States as they develop security of 
supply strategies, the Commission expects gas consumers to be well protected in cases like the 
2008-2009 disruption of natural gas flows through Ukraine by Russia’s Gazprom.  
 The Third Energy Package is a significant milestone in the Commission’s progress 
toward building the European Energy Union because it set guidelines for what were the missing 
pieces of a complete internal natural gas market: Regulation, security of natural gas supply, and 
trans-European gas networks. A discussion of its accomplishments warrants legitimization, 
however, and an answer to the question of whether Member States have been complicit or 
cooperative in the regulations it set forth.  
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CHAPTER 7 
EU Strategy, Policy Plans and Projects for Natural Gas 
 The concept of developing and consolidating trans-European energy networks is not a 
new one, as pipelines are the traditional method of transporting natural gas. In order to 
encompass the Commission’s interest in ensuring the inclusion of these networks, as well as of 
future networks, into European energy policy, it released Decision No 1364/2006/EC for Trans-
European Energy Networks. Known better as the TEN Act, the Decision implemented new 
guidelines for trans-European networks, highlighted projects of common interest toward which 
the Commission could grand monetary support, and laid down a budget to finance feasibility 
studies for these endeavors.  Ultimately, the Parliament and Council also supported the 73
Commission’s projects of common interest and established a funding plan, “A Budget for Europe 
2020”, to funnel EUR 5.12 billion for the development of trans-European energy infrastructure 
projects.  74
i. Infrastructure projects 
 The Third Energy Package’s TEN Act served as the Commission’s endorsement of 
‘projects of common interest’, the natural gas and electricity-related endeavors it identified as 
 European Parliament and the Council (2006), Decision No 1364/2006/EC laying down guidelines for trans-73
European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC.
 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 74
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:A Budget for Europe 2020”, COM(2011) 500 final, European 
Commission, 29 June 2011. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?
uri=URISERV:bu0001&from=EN.
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relevant to European energy goals. Today, those projects number over 190, and half of them 
concern natural gas infrastructure, according to European Commission Vice President and 
President of the European Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič.  In a more recent regulation from 75
2013, the Commission highlights the importance of ensuring pan-European support, explaining 
that “projects of common interest should be implemented as quickly as possible and should be 
closely monitored and evaluated, while keeping the administrative burden for project promoters 
to a minimum.”  The following discussion of notable pipeline projects supported by EU 76
Member States provides an image of EU, national, and foreign interests and the influence they 
have in the success and failure of collective efforts to develop the natural gas sector.   
ii. Nabucco 
The Nabucco project, or the Turkey-Austria natural gas pipeline, was first conceived in 
2002. It was then named a project of common interest in the TEN Act.  In winter 2008-2009, 77
Russia halted natural gas supplies to South-East Europe through Ukraine over a dispute between 
the two countries. As a result, the EU estimated EUR 1.65 billion in economic damages, and 
natural gas consumers in the region suffered a supply crisis that Europeans - particularly those at 
the EU institutional level - would refer to as a justification for the urgency to implement security 
 Maroš Šefčovič, “Energy Union: 2016 as a year of delivery” (presentation, Big IdEAs Series, International Energy 75
Agency, Paris, France, February 15, 2016). Available at https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/events/bigideas/.
 European Parliament and European Council, “Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European 76
energy infrastructure,” Official Journal of the European Union, April 17, 2013. 
 EurActiv with Reuters. “EU-backed Nabucco project ‘over’ after rival pipeline wins Azeri gas bid,” euractiv.com, 77
June 27, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-backed-nabucco-project-over-after-rival-pipeline-
wins-azeri-gas-bid/.; European Parliament and the European Council, “Decision No 1364/2006/EC laying down 
guidelines for trans-European energy networks,” Official Journal of the European Union, September 6, 2006, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32006D1364.
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of natural gas supply legislation for years to come.  Though Gazprom suffered as well, citing 78
losses of USD 1.5 billion, the incident positioned the European Commission on the natural gas 
defensive.  Without delay, a legal framework for the Nabucco Agreement was signed between 79
EU countries and Turkey, symbolizing the EU’s support for a deal to construct a natural gas 
pipeline running from Turkey’s eastern border through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to a gas 
hub in Austria. The agreement also attracted attention from Iraq, who pledged to supply the 
pipeline with half of its natural gas capacity.   80
 Nabucco was projected to have a supply capacity of 31 bcm, and the EU was prepared to 
invest EUR 200 million in the hopes that it would contribute to European economic recovery. 
Stretching across a five-year timeline, the Nabucco consortium was expected to have completed 
the engineering logistics and commissioned pipes and compressor stations by the end of 2009, to 
begin construction by 2011, to determine suppliers by 2012, and to become operational by 2014. 
The pipeline would source supplies first from Azerbaijan, and the expectation was for Middle 
Eastern countries to follow – Iran included. At least 50 percent of the gas Nabucco would have 
supplied was intended to reach the open market.  The contract between EU members and 81
Turkey left certain details up for debate: To how much of the gas was Turkey entitled? Would 
Russia have access? Was Iran’s involvement in the project - and supply of natural gas through 
the pipeline - a viable option? 
 Andreas Goldthau, “The Politics of Natural Gas Development in the European Union,” Harvard University’s 78
Belfer Center and Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for Energy Studies, October 2013, http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MO-CES-pub-GeoGasEU-102513.pdf.
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 Despite the geopolitically sensitive questions that hovered over the project, several 
companies pledged a stake in the construction of Nabucco - OMV of Austria, BOTAS of Turkey, 
MOL Group of Hungary, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, and Transgaz of Romania. Not long after, 
however, a wave of complications emerged. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed 
with Turkmenistan to build a pipeline north to Russia, depriving Nabucco of gas supplies. Russia 
struck again in 2009, when Putin secured an agreement with Turkey allowing Russia to conduct 
seismic tests needed to begin building a new pipeline - South Stream. Though natural gas prices 
were falling at the time due to increased LNG and shale gas production, support for Nabucco 
seemed to be faltering as Russia sought to source its own natural gas supplies to the EU. South 
Stream appeared to the Commission to be a clear affront to European diversification efforts. 
Nonetheless, the Russian-led South Stream project attracted support from major European 
companies such as EDF of France and Wintershall of Germany. With South Stream to compete 
with, the Nabucco project experienced a series of delays because the consortium of energy 
companies involved hadn’t finalized firm supply contracts. As a result, it failed to reach any of 
its deadlines. 
 Ultimately, Nabucco is evidence that the Commission may throw its support behind a 
project, but without confidence from EU Member States and the private sector, it is no match to 
market forces and competition. 
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iii. South Stream 
            The South Stream project is a USD 16 million offshore pipeline planned to carry 63 bcm 
from Russia to Bulgaria through the Black Sea, and further to Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, and 
possibly Italy. It was initially proposed and initiated to circumvent Ukraine, through which 80 
percent of Russian gas exports to the EU flows, in light of Russian-Ukrainian tensions over the 
past decade – the same ones that inspired the EU to support Nabucco. South Stream was 
originally backed by a contract signed in 2014 by Gazprom and Italy’s Eni subsidiary Saipen, 
who had originally planned it to be the first of four parallel pipelines connecting Europe and 
Russia. In 2015, however, Gazprom finally decided to officially terminate the contract because 
the two companies were unable to reach an agreement on new terms. The Russian gas giant’s 
plans for another pipeline project to supply natural gas to Europe through Turkey, known as 
TurkStream, serves as a replacement for the cancellation.  Still in conception, TurkStream has 82
yet to engender the level of debate that surrounded Nabucco and South Stream. 
iv. Nord Stream 
 Nord Stream is yet another project of common interest to the European Commission, 
though this one is heavily backed by Russia’s Gazprom as well as Germany’s E.ON and BASF, 
the UK’s Shell, and Austria’s OMV. Linking Russia and Germany across the Baltic Sea since 
2012, Nord Stream’s current production capacity is 110 billion cubic meters. Those numbers are 
soon to rise, however, as plans for a Nord Stream 2, an extension project of the original pipeline, 
are put into motion. Projections indicate the extension will double Nord Stream’s production 
 “Gazprom terminates South Stream natural gas pipeline construction contract with Saipem,” Platts, July 9, 2015, 82
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/istanbul/gazprom-terminates-south-stream-natural-gas-
pipeline-26144302. 
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capacity. The new project is not popular with advocates of the European Energy Union, however, 
as it’s believed it will reinforce the EU’s reliance upon Russia for natural gas supply and detract 
from the Commission’s efforts to diversify energy sources.  In November 2015, a group of 83
Baltic and Eastern European countries wrote publicly to President of the Energy Union Maroš 
Šefčovič expressing concerns for their energy security if Nord Stream 2 went online.  Concerns 84
have since escalated to the Commission level, where as recently as April 2016, EU Energy 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete expressed concern that Nord Stream 2 would threaten the 
EU’s diversification strategy.   85
 The extension has also caught the attention of American policymakers, US deputy 
secretary for energy, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, in particular. “All of us share the sense that it 
is important to have multiple energy sources, to be dependent on no single source, to use a 
diversity of fuels,” she said, reflecting the concern of Europe’s American partners for the EU’s 
energy future. “This doubling of one pipeline from one source, instead of creating multiple 
routes from multiple sources across that territory, does not appear to enhance Europe’s energy 
security.”   86
Despite the Commission’s most recent rhetoric regarding the Russian and German-
backed pipeline, the Nord Stream story presents a striking example of ‘great power’ EU Member 
 “European Commission concerned of Nord Stream-2 impact on Ukraine’s gas transit – official,” Tass Russian 83
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States and private stakeholders’ influence over Commission initiatives. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
Commission did not always oppose the Nord Stream concept – in fact, it de facto supported it in 
its conception. Because the EU named Nord Stream as a project of common interest, companies 
of the consortium committed to its construction were exempted from following the regulations to 
which other consortia were subjected, such as third-party access and unbundling. Gazprom, 
therefore, was allowed to keep its simultaneous ownership and supplier status while achieving 
major network access bypassing Ukraine. The example of Nord Stream serves as an example of a 
project of common interest that enabled the consortium of German companies and Gazprom a 
special degree of influence and great power status. 
 The survival of Nord Stream and death of South Stream are not a coincidence. Unlike 
Nord Stream, South Stream posed too much of a threat to Europe’s Southern Corridor projects - 
Nabucco and TAP - to be backed by the Commission. While Nabucco and the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP), which will connect Azerbaijan to Italy through Greece and Albania, received 
exemption from TEN requirements, South Stream did not.   87
It is true that the European Commission’s Energy Union initiatives directly affected the 
fate of these two pipelines, proving to Russia and European institutions that EU policies are 
capable of countering Gazprom’s reach. 
 The contested nature of European natural gas infrastructure elucidates the influence of 
‘great powers’ as Member States and private companies alike. It also highlights the fact that the 
growth - or lack thereof - of pan-European energy policy to encompass the European 
Commission’s ideas for an Energy Union is in the hands of the a trifecta of main actors. Those 
 “How the Game Is Played: The Life and Death of South Stream,” Stratfor, September 17, 2015, https://87
www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-game-played-life-and-death-south-stream. 
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are European institutions, namely the Commission, Parliament, and Council; EU Member States; 
and private stakeholders, namely private energy companies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Key EU Energy Actors and Their Impact on Gas Market Regulation  
The following section discusses how one kind of actor - private energy companies - 
express their influence at the EU level.  
The many interests of the previously mentioned actors in Europe’s natural gas market 
make it difficult for the Commission to achieve convergence of those interests and policies. 
However, the internal market is a large accomplishment of the Treaty of Lisbon and for the EU’s 
concerted effort to reconcile the interests of businesses and citizen-consumers. It has succeeded 
in liberalizing the European gas market, continues to be a pillar of EU progress and has been 
promoted by the Commission as the “single most important factor pulling the current [energy] 
society towards convergence.”  It is the internal market as a whole, and the internal market for 88
natural gas in particular, that make the European Commission a primary influencer alongside 
Member States and private stakeholders in the domain of the natural gas market. 
 The EU’s efforts to extend this mission across the European energy sector have been 
especially swift since the Treaty of Lisbon enabled the Commission a role in energy-related 
policy with the Third Energy Package and Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. The Third Energy Package is the most strident effort yet by the European 
 Pami Aalto and Dicle Korkmaz Temel, “European Energy Security: Natural gas and the Integration Process,” 88
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies.
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Union to break up large, vertically-integrated energy companies in France, Germany, and in other 
EU countries.  89
i. Efficacy of the Energy Union 
 Though there are initiatives in place to build an Energy Union, whether or not they 
effective in shifting private firms’ and Member States’ behavior to adopt more favorable 
practices for a common market is a necessary consideration. If the Commission’s successes are 
merely superficial skeletons of policy and guidelines for action, diversification of the European 
natural gas market to include new countries such as Iran is unlikely. 
 The Third Energy Package does mark a few major accomplishments by the Commission. 
It is responsible for establishing investment in gas pipelines and allocated EUR1.440 billion to 
16 projects for the expansion of storage capacity, the construction of alternative pipelines, and 
the development of LNG terminals. It also established energy-specialized bodies and ensured 
their coordination with the Commission. They include the previously mentioned ENTSO-G, the 
Gas Coordination Group, and ACER, which regulate and monitor energy production, 
distribution, and consumption. These organizations are responsible for keeping gas companies 
accountable – and transparent – about their production, distribution, and information-sharing of 
profits and other activities. 
ii. Energy Industry Lobbying at the EU Level 
 However, multinational energy companies have a special place in the hallways and 
meeting rooms of the European Parliament and Council, which are frequented by their lobbyists. 
Transparency International reports that “with 75 percent of the total, meetings with corporate 
 “Commission rebuffs Franco-German energy proposals,” EurActiv.com, February 15, 2008, http://89
www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/commission-rebuffs-franco-german-energy-proposals/. 
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lobbyists dominate the Commission’s agenda and tech, finance, and energy companies take the 
lead.”  Gauging precisely how convincing energy companies are in their meetings with EU 90
leaders is a difficult qualitative assessment to make. Most private lobbying activities “remain 
opaque” due to a lack of comprehensive monitoring tools at the EU level. One optional tool 
worth mentioning, however, is hosted by the European Commission and allows companies to 
report details of their meetings with EU-level representatives including expenditure, participants, 
and subjects of interest and action. Corporate Europe is an organization that tracks this 
‘transparency register’. The group reported impressive increased lobbying expenditure from 
major European energy companies including the multinational power company ENEL, whose 
spending reached over EUR2.2 million in 2014, compared to EUR500,000 in 2013, and from oil 
multinational BP, whose spending doubled to just under EUR3 million in 2014. The report marks 
decreased expenditure among a host of companies such as France’s Engie, Sweden’s Vattenfall, 
the UK’s hydraulic fracturing company Cuadrilla, Norway’s Statoil, and even Germany’s Energie 
Baden-Württemberg AG.   91
Companies haven’t used the Commission’s transparency tool to share why they’ve 
increased or decreased expenditure, but conjectures can be made. For example, ENEL, which has 
a large natural gas presence in Italy, might be lobbying for support from Parliament and the 
Council for TAP, the Greece-Italy interconnector to supply gas from Azerbaijan. BP’s increased 
expenditure also coincides with the timing of its own projects. The company’s business timeline 
 Transparency International EU Office, “Press release: banks, tech, and energy companies dominate EU lobbying,” 90
Transparency International. December 1, 2015. http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/2015/12/press-release-
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in 2014 has a heavy focus on deadlines for its investments in the South Caucasus Pipeline 
Expansion project (SCPX), as well as in the Azerbaijan-based Shah Deniz pipeline Stage 2 
(SD2), and further elucidates the company’s interests.  92
 Lobbying is just one way in which private companies can influence policymakers’ 
positions on both national and EU energy strategy. If the sheer scale of their monetary 
contributions to lobbying are not effective, their capacity to support projects of interest to the EU 
also act as a bargaining tool, which the Nord Stream project illustrates. As policy proposals for 
the European Energy Union continue to unfold, the Commission remains beholden to national 
representatives in the Parliament and Council responsible for qualified majority votes that either 
approve or reject new policies. In such a distribution of power, Member States are indeed 
influenced by private actors, making the job of the Commission to achieve an Energy Union and 
ensure the diversification of EU energy markets all the more challenging. 
 “Shah Deniz Project Timeline,” BP, last updated 2016, http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/92
Shahdeniz/projecthistory.html. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Iran and the EU: Interests, Recent Developments, and Barriers to Trade 
 As Iran reenters the global market following JCPOA and the gradual relief of 
international sanctions, key EU stakeholders including EU institutions, Member States, and 
private firms, have either courted or been courted by the Iranian natural gas sector. As Iran seeks 
to demonstrate its energy sector capabilities and worthiness of international investment, each 
actor has taken its own approach to engagement. It is worthwhile to explore how stakeholder 
interests and alternative business opportunities may well intercede to slow or halt possible 
progress in EU energy diversification through Iran’s natural gas market. 
i. Iran’s Interests in a Relationship with the EU & Recent Developments 
Interests 
 With 1,201 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, Iran has enormous potential 
as a major future supplier of the world market.  In fact, Iran comes in close second with Russia 93
among countries with world’s largest natural gas reserves. Estimates from the EIA indicate that 
Russia’s reserves reach 1,688 trillion cubic feet.  Iranian and EU estimates indicate that Iran will 94
be capable of exporting between 25-35 bcm to the EU by 2030, equaling EU imports from North 
African countries. These estimates include an important assumption - that LNG facilities are 
 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” BP, June 2015, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-93
economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf. 
 “Russia,” Energy Information Administration, last updated July 28, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/94
analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf.
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developed to liquefy gas for export from Iran and to de-liquefy those exports at EU delivery 
points.   95
 Iran’s economy would benefit significantly from renewed energy trade with the EU, and 
it particularly stands to gain from infrastructure investments by European firms and through 
increased energy exports. Between the time that sanctions were implemented in 2012 and took 
full effect in 2013, Iranian exports to the EU dropped from €5.7 billion to €0.8 billion.  Many 96
European energy companies had pre-sanctions business ties and projects with Iran. A number of 
energy projects described earlier were interrupted by the advent of sanctions, including a BP-
National Iranian Oil Company joint venture in the Rhum gas field off the coast of Scotland, 
stalled plans for LNG infrastructure development, and slowed construction of Iran’s South Pars 
Gas field projects.  Re-initiating these engagements could enable a wave of foreign investment 97
in Iranian infrastructure projects and commerce.  
Recent Developments 
 Diplomatic and economic re-engagement have been the focus of a flurry of activity 
between European stakeholders and Iran. In Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s January 2016 
visit to Europe, he visited the home of companies like Peugeot in France and Ansaldo Energia in 
Italy, which had just struck deals for investment in the Iranian automobile and energy industries, 
 Norman, Laurence and Gabriele Steinhauser, “Iran Could Become Major Supplier of Natural Gas to EU,” The 95
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respectively.  Iran has also recently participated in talks with European companies including 98
Golnar LNG Ltd. to build floating LNG facilities. Other domestic developments in Iran, such as 
its renewed commitment in 2015 to build a sixth pipeline running from its South Pars gas field 
which could be capable of sending gas to Iraq and Central and Eastern Europe indicate that it is 
preparing to begin expanding its capabilities for both domestic and external distribution of 
natural gas. 
ii. EU Interests in Iran 
 The EU sees its past relations with Iran as a “model for much broader cooperation” in the 
areas of energy trade, economic development and geopolitical cooperation.  As the EU looks to 99
Iran to potentially help it reduce an increasingly worrisome dependence upon Russian energy, it 
is preparing to send to Iran a delegation of EU Ministers at time of writing. These include High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) Federica Mogherini, European 
Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete, as well as the ministers 
representing the Commission’s directorates for Internal Market and Industry, Transport, 
Research, Education, Humanitarian Aid, and Environment. Together, they will explore different 
sectors of cooperation and seek to build “cooperative relations between the EU and Iran on the 
areas where there is mutual interest.”  In an effort to maintain a normative focus while 100
 Stacey Meichtry and Robert Wall, “Iran President Visits Europe to Seal Post-Sanctions Deals Worth Billions,” The 98
Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-rouhani-starts-first-post-sanctions-
european-trip-1453723466.
 Norman, Laurence and Gabriele Steinhauser, “Iran Could Become Major Supplier of Natural Gas to EU,” The 99
Wall Street Journal.
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rekindling economic relations, Mogherini and the delegation expressed in advance of their trip 
hopes for Iran’s openness to European companies assisting in the development of promising new 
markets such as renewable energy, as well as a willingness to play a ‘supportive role’ with 
respect to Iran’s intentions to join the World Trade Organization.  101
EU Member States’ interests 
 The leaders of EU Member States took the nuclear deal as an opportunity to welcome a 
friendlier dialogue with Iran and to visit the country in expressions of partnership and optimism. 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited in July 2015 and the German Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited twice in three months between late 2015 and early 2016.  Most 102
recently, in April 2016, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi made the first visit by an Italian 
official to Tehran since 2001, seeking to reinstate Italy in its prior role as “Iran’s biggest trade 
partner in the European Union”.  Though the discussion of natural gas was not explicitly on the 103
agenda, these visits signaled to citizens and the private sector the renewal of an environment for 
commercial engagement. 
EU private stakeholders’ interests 
 While delegations of Commissioners, heads of state and foreign ministers make 
diplomatic overtures to engage with Iran on trade and foreign policy, engagement between Iran 
 Jorge Valero, “Commission embarks on business trip to Tehran, despite renewed sanctions,” EurActiv.com. April 101
14, 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/commission-embarks-on-business-trip-to-tehran-
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and European actors with respect to natural gas market development takes place at the level of 
private stakeholders. While the potential export of natural gas to Europe is a new phenomenon 
and Iran’s natural gas resources have primarily served domestic demand, European energy firms 
such as Shell, Total, and Eni have already begun to explore the option of investing, and have 
been involved in talks with the Iranian energy sector.  Anticipating an international resolution 104
to the Iran nuclear question, “European industries with a history of business in Iran wanted their 
companies to go there and invest big time...before the Americans and the Chinese”.  Concerned 105
businesses took early steps by establishing a European-Iranian Business Alliance to promote a 
quick and profitable turnaround of trade.  
 Following the nuclear agreement with Iran and ratification of the JCPOA, delegations of 
European energy companies including BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol, Total, Engie, and Statoil 
also mobilized within Europe to meet with EU Climate and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias 
Cañete and discuss possibilities and next steps in their affairs with Iran.  Energy companies are 106
among the enterprises that retained contacts in Iran through years of trade embargoes. Sohbet 
Karbuz confirmed that some companies have conducted research, development, and risk 
assessments as they have sought to determine the profitability of investing in the Iranian natural 
gas sector.  107
 Dan Cancian, “The Iran Rush: European and Asian firms on starting line as sanctions are lifted,” January 23, 104
2016, Ibtimes.com, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/european-asian-firms-set-enter-iranian-markets-after-sanctions-are-
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 Despite diplomatic visits and rhetorical interest in natural gas trade abound, following the 
JCPOA, there have been no natural gas agreements between European countries to date, and few 
energy deals overall. It is a fact that warrants the question of why this is the case. 
 Thierry Coville of l’Institut pour la recherche internationale et stratégique (IRIS) believes 
that though Iran will, indeed, play a role in European energy commerce in the years to come, the 
environment is unfavorable for natural gas exports. Exports will depend, to a great degree, upon 
Iran’s capacity to attract foreign investors to develop their reserves; another key question is the 
future of Iranian gas distribution routes. Coville believes that lingering trust issues between 
Europe and some elements of the Iranian regime will likely exclude the possibility of long-term 
partnerships with Iran on the import of gas, but that it’s possible “the vision will change and a 
partnership could develop.”  108
There are several tangible obstacles for EU private stakeholders to overcome prior to 
investing in the Iranian market for natural gas. These include a lack of infrastructure in Europe 
and Iran as well as the presence of alternative natural gas partners for both actors. These 
obstacles are both discussed in the following section  
iii. Infrastructure considerations for EU private stakeholders 
 Under pressure to implement more reliable gas supplies and to satisfy projected increases 
in energy demand, the European Commission has turned to natural gas as an abundant, relatively 
clean fossil fuel. In its Energy Security Strategy, the Commission seeks to give energy 
companies and EU Member States the green light to pursue new energy relationships (with U.S. 
shale gas suppliers, for example), to foster deeper ties in existing partnerships (the INOGATE 
 Thierry Coville. Email interview. (Iran business and economics expert at Institut pour la recherche internationale 108
et stratégique and Novancia Business School), interview by Lily S. Emamian, December 3, 2015.
 !55
countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), and to pursue alternative routes for 
natural gas pipelines capable of pumping Russian fuel (South Stream, Nord Stream, TANAP, and 
TAP). The EU’s Energy Security Strategy explains that “the key to improved energy security lies 
first…in a functioning internal market…and second, in a more coherent external action.”  109
 Indeed, while there are alternatives to Russian gas, the failure of the Nabucco Pipeline 
project described previously serves as a reminder of the obstacles involved in implementing 
these alternatives. To successfully achieve a European Energy Union and progress toward a 
common strategy for facilitating the import of natural gas from new suppliers like Iran, Europe 
will need to expand pipeline and LNG infrastructure. As of 2014, the EU imported 197 bcm per 
year of LNG but only used a quarter of it. Furthermore, only five EU Member States are 
responsible for the import of most LNG consumed in Europe, largely because they possess the 
infrastructure needed to import, process, and distribute it.  With LNG imports projected to 110
increase, more terminals are necessary to satisfy overall natural gas demand. The EU will also 
need to expand its internal network of gas pipelines and to integrate the existing pipeline 
infrastructure with expansion projects. Most of these are listed in TEN’s projects of common 
interest, discussed previously, but require further investment.  
iv. Alternative partners for the EU and Iran 
 Under pressure to diversify resources both to ensure security of natural gas supply and to 
meet future energy demands, the European Commission has turned to existing neighborhood 
partners for alternatives. to foster new infrastructure developments in Turkey, Central and 
 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council : European Energy Security 109
Strategy/COM/2014/0330 final,” European Commission.
 “Briefing: LNG in Europe,” European Parliament, November 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/110
etudes/BRIE/2015/571314/EPRS_BRI(2015)571314_EN.pdf.
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Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Taking advantage of its relationship with Azerbaijan through 
INOGATE, a regional energy cooperation program between the EU and 11 partner countries in 
Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia, the EU has maintained its support for the TAP 
pipeline. The EU also used its relationship with Azerbaijan to pursue alternative routes for the 
Nabucco pipeline. 
 Iran’s domestic focus on developing its LNG infrastructure could lead it to export to 
nations with rapidly rising natural gas demand. Markets in Asia and the Middle East present 
immediate opportunities for Iranian gas traders who expect capacity to increase enough to begin 
exporting in the next decade.  Iran began negotiations on developing a pipeline connector with 111
India as early as the 1990s. According to the IEA, India will see a dramatic increase of natural 
gas demand in coming years, and is expected to meet that demand primarily with LNG after 
2030.  Pakistan, with which Iran already has developed its share of a pipeline running from the 112
South Pars gas fields eastward to their shared border, is also likely to reinitiate its share of the 
project soon.  China, whose gas imports increased between 2009-2011 from 8 bcm to 31 bcm, 113
pledged to build a major part of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, and has helped make the project a 
front-runner in Iran’s long-term natural gas strategy.  Finally, Oman worked with Iran despite 114
 Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, “ Iran: a new natural gas supplier for Europe?,” beyondbrics (blog), 111
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sanctions in 2013 and agreed to build a subsea pipeline and to import $60 billion over 25 
years.  115
 With the incentive of profitable alternatives for export trade, and a high infrastructure 
price tag, Europe may not be an ideal market for Iran after all. As Rodrigo Pinto Scholtbach 
warned, warm winters, low prices, and an economic crisis have made Europe an unreliable 
natural gas market in the near-to-intermediate term.  Furthermore, according to Thomas 116
Pellerin-Carlin, the prices Asian markets are willing to pay can be up to double those of EU 
countries.  At the moment, private EU stakeholders are deterred by up-front the investment 117
required in European pipeline or LNG infrastructure, and probably will defer such investments 
until the European natural gas market becomes a more profitable and attractive option. Iran is in 
a similar spot with limited existing pipeline or LNG infrastructure, a quickly-growing domestic 
demand for natural gas, and a natural gas market in need of a major regulatory overhaul in its 
post-sanctions recovery. In this environment, European investors are unlikely to dive in for the 
foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusions 
i. Challenges for the EU in leveraging Iran as a new gas supplier 
Pricing 
 The European Commission and its partner institutions have much work ahead before the 
quest to build a comprehensive Energy Union is complete. Notably, the Commission, Parliament, 
and Council must formally agree with its Member States to resolve a series of issues.  
First, the EU’s institutions must agree to set a common price among Member States for 
Russian gas. Doing so would set a precedent for pan-European determination of energy prices 
and set the stage for determining natural gas prices for future imports from, say, Iran. As Iran’s 
expectations for pricing is significantly higher than what Europe pays for Russian gas, 
establishing solidarity on the issue is of particular importance. However, developing a pan-
European price for gas is an effort that particularly concerns Germany and Hungary, who have 
objected to supporting the Commission’s proposals in the past for fear of forfeiting their bilateral 
agreements with Russia’s Gazprom for competitively-priced natural gas supplies. 
The example of Germany as a ‘great power’ state 
 To move the Energy Union forward, the European Commission will need to convince 
Germany to support its efforts. Currently, German energy policy is driven to a great degree by 
private interests, in comparison with some of its neighbors, such as France, whose major gas 
subsidiary is nationalized. German policy therefore allows companies such as RWE, E.ON, 
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Wintershall, and EnBW to wield great influence. This complicates not only Berlin’s decision-
making with respect to whether or not to support Energy Union proposals; it also puts the 
Commission’s efforts at building a consensus among all Member States at risk. As previously 
mentioned, the Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany has significant support from a 
team of German companies. E.ON, BASF, Shell, and OMV have a memorandum of 
understanding with Gazprom to build infrastructure capable of transporting 55 bcm to Germany, 
which would double Nord Stream’s current capacity.  
 According to the EU’s ‘Framework Strategy’ for a common energy policy, the EU will 
collectively be able to influence contracts with Gazprom by requiring “increased transparency of 
contracts and compatibility with EU energy security” and to require external suppliers to be fully 
complicit with EU regulations.  The Commission will also be able to use its oversight role to 118
demand better terms from Gazprom and future natural gas suppliers. This might include 
engaging in shorter-term contracts or the elimination of Gazprom’s restrictions on re-exporting 
gas among European countries. Overall, Europe will increase its leverage with Russia.  
 A successful Energy Union might enable the EU to seek alternative partners with whom it 
could establish new contracts on the EU’s terms, rather than to negotiate the consolidation of 
existing contracts, infrastructure, economics, and policy. The EU might even overcome the 
Russian strategy of segregating the European market into separate national buyers dependent 
upon Gazprom.  
 Petr Polak, “Europe’s Low Energy: The Promise and Perils of the Energy Union,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, 118
2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-09-09/europes-low-energy.
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ii. Final Conclusions 
The Commission has succeeded in making major strides in policy and planning as it 
seeks to build a complete European Energy Union under the leadership of European Commission 
Vice President and President of the European Energy Union, Maroš Šefčovič. However, it will 
not succeed in building the comprehensive European Energy Union by the end of it’s targeted 
“year of delivery”, 2016. Two main obstacles remain: 
1. Natural gas supply and the geopolitics of natural gas infrastructure will continue to be 
dominated by private companies, and these stakeholders will continue to influence 
decision-making in key Member States. Energy firms in Europe are well-equipped to 
achieve their interests with financial resources, by advocating for energy industry-friendly 
policies with national representatives in the European Parliament and Council. 
2. Barring major geopolitical shifts or major pricing or supply shocks in energy markets, 
Iran will not become a major supplier of natural gas to Europe in the short or medium 
term. IEA Medium-Term gas projections forecast Russia’s continued supply of gas to the EU 
and limited production capacity from Iran. Though sanctions relief makes way for foreign 
investors, Iran is unequipped for LNG production and transport, does not currently have 
sufficient pipeline infrastructure to meet the demands of consumers outside its immediate 
neighborhood, and foreign investors will continue to be deterred by the legacy of sanctions. 
Iran will seek other avenues for natural gas export, however, once it accomplishes enough 
production and import capacity to satisfy domestic demand. 
The Energy Union will face continued skepticism from Member States and private 
stakeholders whose interests are best served by maintaining the status quo in terms of energy 
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policy. The example of the Nord Stream 2 and Nabucco pipeline projects illustrate this point. 
Moving forward, the fate of the union will depend largely upon whether Member States remain 
averse to pursuing alternative natural gas options and whether they can resist sticking to the 
European natural gas model that emphasizes imports from Russia and diverts from new 
developments.  
In short, there are too many obstacles between the Commission and its energy goals for it 
to include significant imports from new natural gas suppliers, including Iran, among its short- to 
medium-term goals. 
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